Allied Irish Banks plc & Anor v. Doran

Valuation for bank: ‘whether the valuations on the Bank’s file were or were not sufficient was a matter exclusively for the Bank’ [83]

1. 1.1

   Borrower indifference: ‘Mr. Doran was not interested in whether the valuation conditions were satisfied and had no contractual right to expect that they had been.’ [86]

2. 1.2

   No evidence of lower value: ‘onus of proof was on him to lead evidence at the trial – if he had it – that the land was worth less than he paid for it and he did not do so.’ [94]

3. 1.3

   Valuation speculative: ‘As any sensible developer should know – but as during the years of the boom many speculators forgot or ignored – the value of development land depends upon zoning, access and services. … Bank was not obliged by law to save him from himself.’ [100]

IBRC Ltd v. Cambourne Investments Incorporated [2012] IEHC 262, [2014] 4 IR 54 applied: ‘[I]t would make no sense that he would be absolved of his liability to repay the loan but get to keep the property purchased with the bank’s money.’ [58] ‘[A]ny breach of any such obligation would have sounded in damages.’ [83]

Dormer v. Allied Irish Banks plc [2017] IECA 199 on burden in misrepresentation pleas not applied: ‘By pleading the fraud, Mr. Doran assumed the burden of proving it at trial.’ [115] ‘[P]ermitted amendment merely allowed him to make at trial whatever case he could in relation to the asserted fraud’ [98]

1. 3.1

   Rebuke to Counsel: Position ‘that he could not offer an explanation as to how these valuations were produced. That was wholly unsatisfactory in a case in which fraud had been pleaded and the case opened as a fraud case’ [91] ‘[W]ell-deserved rebuke to experienced counsel for opening a fraud case without being able to say what the case was’ [114]

2. 3.2

   Parol evidence rule applied: ‘If in October or November, 2005 Mr. Doran asked whether the Bank’s prime rate was the ECB rate and was told that it was, there would have been no reason for him to have asked the same question again. … In seeking to make the case which he did in relation to the interest rate, Mr. Doran was seeking to rely on parol evidence to contradict the plain terms of the written contracts.’ [120]

Trial adversarial: ‘trial of the action was not an inquisition into whatever issues or concerns Mr. Doran might have wanted to raise. It was an adversarial hearing.’ [96]

Assignment found valid: ‘trial judge expressly found that the debt and security had been validly assigned to Everyday.’ [72]

Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank v. O’Malley [2019] IESC 84, [2022] 2 IR 487 on level of detail in summary judgment distinguished: ‘This was not a motion for summary judgment.’ [73]

New point on appeal: ‘Mr. Doran is not entitled to seek to canvas on the appeal any issue as to the standing and entitlement of Everyday which was not raised in the High Court.’ [78]

Burden of proof unaffected: ‘judge ruled that the contracts as executed were prima facie evidence of the claim and that Mr. Doran’s side should go first in relation to all issues.’ [68] ‘[N]othing unfair in the ruling of the trial judge in relation to the running order’ [71]

Case mostly admitted: ‘on the pleadings, the loan agreements, the advances and the failure to repay were all admitted.’ [69]

Hay v. O’Grady [1992] 1 IR 210 on findings of primary fact implicitly applied: ‘For the reasons he gave, the judge preferred Ms. Scanlon’s evidence. That is the role of the trial judge.’ [106]

Doyle v. Banville [2012] IESC 25, [2018] 1 IR 505 not applied: Defendant/Appellant ‘did not contend that the conclusion to which the judge had come was not one that was open to him on the evidence.’ [105]

Mallak v. Minister for Justice [2012] IESC 59, [2012] 3 IR 297 not applied: ‘Mr. Doran never suggested that he did not understand why he had lost.’ [118]

Appeal dismissed: High Court order of payment affirmed with ‘costs of the proceedings and of the counterclaim, to include any and all reserved costs and the costs of discovery, with the exception of the application to join Everyday’ [124].

1. 13.1

   Undertakings discharged: Undertakings to sell secured properties pending appeal, ‘not unlike the settlement reached in 2023 … appear to have proven unworkable’ [125], ‘overtaken by the determination of the appeal and should be discharged’ [126].

2. 13.2

   Presumptive costs: Plaintiffs/Respondents ‘presumptively entitled to an order for their costs.’ [127]