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Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC v. Mallon

2 October 2026 – High Court – [2026] IEHC 649

Summary de novo appeal from Circuit Court order of possession over principal private residence [1] on unregistered land [44]. Mortgage allegedly passed from original lender to another in 2014 and then to Plaintiff/Respondent in 2019 [1]. Transfer documentation ‘incomplete, materially redacted, or dependent upon documents which have not been produced.’ [78] Summary possession refused and remitted to plenary hearing [79].

  1. 1.

    Section 62(7) of the Registration of Title Act 1964 not applied: ‘Plaintiff’s entitlement to possession therefore falls to be determined by reference to the mortgage deed, the applicable principles of conveyancing law and Order 5B of the Circuit Court Rules. In that context, particular care must be taken in relation to proof of title and enforceability, as there is no equivalent of s. 31 of the 1964 Act by which entries in a public register may be treated as conclusive evidence of title or burden.’ [44]

    1. 1.1

      KBC Bank Ireland plc v. Wilson [2019] IEHC 870 affirmed: Plaintiff/Respondent must prove, ‘at least on a prima facie basis’:

      1. ‘the existence and terms of the secured loan’;
      2. ‘the mortgage securing that indebtedness’;
      3. ‘its entitlement to enforce both the debt and the security’;
      4. ‘the occurrence of default’;
      5. ‘that the contractual right to possession has arisen and become exercisable.’ [45]
    2. 1.2

      Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank v. Cody [2021] IESC 26 on unregistered land applied: ‘while a mortgagee of unregistered land traditionally acquires a legal estate carrying a right to possession, that right remains subject to the terms of the mortgage itself.’ [47]

    3. 1.3

      Promontoria (Finn) Ltd v. Flavin [2023] IEHC 663 distinguished: ‘not a case in which the mortgage instrument itself is unavailable.’ [59]

1. Chain of title

  1. 2.

    Title decisive: ‘decisive issue in this appeal is not whether the Defendant/Appellant has established a defence based on settlement, redemption or discharge of the mortgage. It is whether the Plaintiff/Respondent has established, by admissible and intelligible evidence, that it is the party entitled to enforce the debt and security.’ [77]

  2. 3.

    Mars Capital Finance Ireland DAC v. Temple [2023] IEHC 94, Everyday Finance DAC v. Woods [2019] IEHC 605 and Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC v. O’Reilly [2026] IEHC 106 applied: ‘Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing an unbroken chain of legal entitlement from the original lender to the moving party. … a deed could not properly be understood where essential definitions were absent. … where one instrument is dependent upon another for its interpretation, the legal effect of the transaction cannot be determined without production of the underlying document.’ [60]

    1. 3.1

      Purchase Deed over-redacted: ‘Deed of Assignment cannot be interpreted in isolation. I am therefore unable to verify whether the assignment extended to the debt now sought to be enforced because essential definitions, including most specifically the definition of the ‘Purchased Assets’, have been withheld.’ [62]

    2. 3.2

      Mortgage Sale Deed not produced: ‘I cannot determine how IRMT-BW1 DAC featured in the transaction or whether Pepper acquired legal title, equitable title, servicing rights only, or some subset of those interests.’ [63]

      1. 3.2.1

        Interaction of instruments unclear: ‘While the existence of a beneficial owner distinct from the legal owner would not, of itself, prevent enforcement by the legal owner, the absence of the underlying transaction documents prevents me from understanding how the various instruments interact and whether Pepper acquired the legal rights upon which it sues.’ [64]

  3. 4.

    Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC v. O’Reilly [2026] IEHC 106 on redactions applied: ‘party seeking to rely upon a deed must place before the Court documents which are intelligible and meaningful. Save where justified by limited privacy concerns, substantial redactions are ordinarily inappropriate and should be explained on affidavit. No satisfactory explanation has been provided for the omissions and redactions in this case.’ [65]

  4. 5.

    Notice discrepancies: ‘failure to exhibit the ‘goodbye’ letter relating to the first transfer when combined with the fact that the later ‘goodbye’ letter contains an assignment date which does not correspond with the transaction relied upon, compound existing difficulties with this summary application. While such matters may not be determinative in themselves, they assume greater significance where title is disputed and where gaps already exist in the documentary chain.’ [66]

  5. 6.

    Silence on earlier summary attempt: ‘no deponent has addressed in any meaningful way the relationship between the present proceedings and the earlier possession proceedings which were subsequently discontinued. … absence of any clear explanation or evidence from the Plaintiff addressing the broader history of the lending relationship, leaves material questions unanswered and supports a concern summary disposal in this case carries a risk of injustice.’ [67]

  6. 7.

    Chain of title undetermined: ‘I simply cannot determine the legal effect of key documents where essential provisions have been redacted or where documents necessary to their interpretation have not been produced.’ [68]

2. Other evidence

  1. 8.

    Means of knowledge not disclosed: Deponent did not ‘disclose the source of her knowledge of the matters deposed to, identify the records upon which she relies, explain how those records were maintained, or confirm that they are derived from original business records.’ [53]

    1. 8.1

      Ulster Bank Ireland Ltd v. O’Brien [2015] IESC 96 and KBC Bank Ireland plc v. Wilson [2019] IEHC 870 on adverse inference applied: ‘Defendant/Appellant’s conduct can support an inference that he recognised the existence of continuing mortgage indebtedness sufficient, depending on the evidence as a whole, to fill an evidential deficit otherwise arising.’ [55]

      1. 8.1.1

        Engagement and payments after assignment: ‘Defendant/Appellant did not respond to the letters of demand by asserting that the mortgage had been redeemed or that no monies were due. Instead, the evidence indicates continued engagement … and, significantly, the making of payments after the alleged assignment of the loan. This evidence constitutes recognition of the Plaintiff’s apparent authority or servicing role’ [56].

    2. 8.2

      Late settlement defence: ‘Defendant/Appellant’s later contention that the mortgage security had been released pursuant to an earlier settlement may be capable, particularly in the absence of corroborative documentation or other evidence, of supporting inferences adverse to the Defendant/Appellant on this application. … this defence did not emerge until the dismissal applications brought in 2023.’ [57]

  2. 9.

    Deficiency not decisive: ‘evidential deficiencies concerning means of knowledge and admissibility might not, of themselves, require refusal of relief particularly in view of plausibility concerns which support inferences in favour of the Plaintiff/Respondent’ [68].

3. Defences

  1. 10.

    Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank v. O’Malley [2019] IESC 84 applied: ‘it is not necessary for the Defendant/Appellant to demonstrate an arguable defence warranting a plenary hearing. The obligation to do so only arises once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie entitlement to relief’ [70].

    1. 10.1

      Shifting defence unsatisfactory: ‘Defendant/Appellant’s case has altered significantly over time in a most unsatisfactory manner. … The contention that the security had already been released pursuant to a prior settlement emerged only at a much later stage. It is particularly noteworthy that it is not supported by contemporaneous documentation, raising further red flags as to the reliability of this evidence.’ [71]

    2. 10.2

      GDPR no defence: ‘remedies lie to the Data Protection Commissioner in respect of alleged data breaches. … Nor have I been referred to any authority which supports a finding that a data breach could constitute a defence to a claim for an order for possession.’ [73]

    3. 10.3

      Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC v. O’Reilly [2026] IEHC 106 on own-motion review applied: ‘preferable that ‘own motion’ obligations be addressed as part of the plenary hearing where the court is not otherwise satisfied to grant relief on a summary application.’ [75]

      1. 10.3.1

        Consumer status doubtful: ‘unclear that the Defendant/Appellant qualifies as a consumer and this issue was not addressed at all in argument before me.’ [74]

4. Orders

  1. 11.

    Summary possession refused: ‘This conclusion does not represent a finding that Pepper lacks title. Rather, it reflects my inability, on the affidavit evidence before me, to determine whether title has been established.’ [78]

  2. 12.

    Order 5B of the Circuit Court Rules and Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank v. Cody [2021] IESC 26 on remittal applied: ‘I will adjourn the matter for plenary hearing pursuant to Order 5B of the Circuit Court rules and this plenary hearing will be before the High Court’ [79].