Everyday Finance DAC v. Doran & Anor

Motion in default of defence available: ‘next step … for the defendants to deliver their defence. However, their failure to do so did not allow the plaintiff to sit back and do nothing’ [16]. ‘[P]laintiff could have brought a motion for judgment in default of defence at any time after the defendants failed to deliver their defence within the three weeks that had been afforded’ [17].

1. 2.1

   Motion threatened late, irrelevant: ‘over seven years after the 2018 order and a matter of weeks after the defendants had issued their motions [in these proceedings].’ [17]

2. 2.2

   Gallagher v. PW Shaw and Co Ltd [2018] IEHC 556 applied: ‘I do not accept that the defendant’s solicitors were “ghosting” in the background for a period of in excess of thirteen years. They made their position quite clear early on and it seems to me that if the plaintiff was concerned about the attitude being taken by the defendant, this could have been addressed many years previously, by way of motion, application or reconstitution of proceedings’ [18].

3. 2.3

   Liberty to deliver defence, no order: Failure to deliver defence. No ‘breach of the order, albeit it may not comply with the Rules of the Superior Courts.’ [14]

4. 2.4

   Statement of Claim deemed: Special Endorsement of Claim accepted as Statement of Claim. Applicants/Defendants’ argument as to no Statement of Claim dismissed [15].

Denis Guilfoyle Developments Ltd v. Wardrop [2025] IEHC 144 implicitly applied: ‘non inter partes activity of the plaintiff’s solicitor, described as work that is to be done under the surface, was not to be counted in reducing a period of almost five years’ inactivity’ [9]. ‘I do not think such a procedural application, particularly where the defendants were consenting to it – albeit raising an issue about their costs in relation to it – should attract much weight in my assessment as to whether the proceedings were being actively prosecuted.’ [13]

1. 3.1

   Length of delay: ‘combined with the delay of over two years in instituting the substitution applications’ [13].

2. 3.2

   Number of adjournments: ‘not to say such an application attracts no weight, but in the circumstances that prevailed here, and in particular the number of adjournments’ [13].

3. 3.3

   No explanation: ‘for which no explanation is offered’ [13].

4. 3.4

   Time to instruct: ‘including the lengthy period of time it took the plaintiff to instruct their own solicitors to commence that process’ [13].

Delay unreasonable: ‘I do not consider the lengthy period … to have been reasonable’ [13].

Defendants’ assertions irrelevant: ‘defendants had indicated, in a replying affidavit to the summary proceedings, their view that the plaintiff’s proceedings should not proceed until they were resolved.’ [19]

1. 5.1

   No court order: ‘The plaintiff seems to seek to elevate the defendants’ expression of what should occur in the proceedings, to the status of something akin to a court order.’ [19]

2. 5.2

   Reliance unreasonable: ‘As well as apparently relying on the defendants’ assertion as to the relevance of the Belfry proceedings as an excuse for not progressing the proceedings, the plaintiff also seeks to rely on its view of what it anticipated the defendants would do … That is speculative and cannot render it reasonable for the plaintiff to have awaited the outcome of the Belfry proceedings, apparently without even communicating, never mind agreeing, such a position with the defendants.’ [21]

3. 5.3

   Injunction defence not relevant: ‘I do not consider the plaintiff’s defending those proceedings constituted a step in progressing the within proceedings that might neutralise any of the delay.’ [22]

Breach irrelevant: ‘it was a matter for the plaintiff to enforce the judgment it had secured. The defendants’ delay in honouring the judgment, regardless of monies having been deposited in escrow by their solicitor, is not relevant to the within application and does not serve to lessen, forgive, or neutralise the plaintiff’s clear delay in progressing their litigation.’ [23]

Kirwan v. Connors & Ors [2025] IESC 21 on delay in prosecuting proceedings applied: ‘I do not consider the defendants are required to prove specific prejudice.’ [24]

1. 7.1

   In the alternative, oral evidence: ‘If I am wrong on that, then I have regard to the need for oral evidence at plenary hearing which will be difficult for the defendants given the passage of time and their own advanced age’ [24]. Kirwan v. Connors & Ors [2025] IESC 21 at [26(iii)] cited: ‘failing recollection and witness reluctance’ [24].

2. 7.2

   Prolonged stress: ‘stress and uncertainty that protracted litigation, such as this clearly is, involves for the defendants who have had this litigation hanging over them for some ten years’ [24].

Dismissal for delay: Summary proceedings and both enforcement proceedings dismissed [25].

Section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 on costs applied indicatively: ‘As the defendants have succeeded in their application to dismiss the proceedings, my indicative view on costs is that … they are entitled to the costs of the within application and their costs in all three sets of proceedings to date, to be adjudicated upon in default of agreement.’ [26]